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NEPA AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: 
INTEGRATION, IMPLEMENTATION,  
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Uma Outka*
Abstract: The purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
is to assure “for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically 
and culturally pleasing surroundings,” a goal that is essential to environ-
mental justice. Although NEPA provides the structure for federal envi-
ronmental decisionmaking, is it effective as a tool for addressing envi-
ronmental justice concerns? This Essay addresses NEPA’s limitations and 
potential for this purpose, and assesses the role of case law and judicial 
review in shaping this integrative process. To do so, it considers the envi-
ronmental justice implications of NEPA’s structural gaps—including ex-
emptions, categorical exclusions, and so-called “functional equivalents”— 
and evaluates judicial review of agencies’ environmental justice analyses 
to date. 
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Introduction 
 Environmental justice1 formally entered the federal lexicon in 
1994 when President Clinton signed an Executive Order addressing 
“Environmental Justice in Minority and Low-Income Populations.”2 
The Order was an acknowledgment that exposure to environmental 
hazards is related to race and income levels.3 It mandated federal 
agencies to develop strategies for “identifying and addressing . . . 
[the] disproportionately high and adverse human health or environ-
mental effects of [their] programs, policies, and activities on minority 
populations and low-income populations . . . .”4 As a result, federal 
                                                                                                                      
1 There is no ªxed deªnition of environmental justice. According to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA): 
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regu-
lations, and policies. EPA has this goal for all communities and persons across 
this Nation. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of pro-
tection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the deci-
sion-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, 
and work. 
EPA, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2006). For alternative formulations of the term, see Robert R. Kuehn, A 
Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,681, 10,681 (2000); Clifford Recht-
schaffen, Advancing Environmental Justice Norms, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 95, 96 (2003); Mariá 
Ramirez Fisher, Book Note, On the Road from Environmental Racism to Environmental Justice, 4 
Vill. Envtl. L.J. 449, 449–52 (1994); Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environ-
mental Racism, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 839, 839–40 (1992). 
2 Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), amended 
by Exec. Order No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 ( Jan. 30, 1995). For a thorough discussion of 
the Order, see generally Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12,898, in The Law of Envi-
ronmental Justice: Theories and Procedures to Address Disproportionate Risks 
103, 103 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999) [hereinafter Law of Environmental Justice]. 
The development of the environmental justice movement that prompted President 
Clinton’s Executive Order has been well documented. See Bunyan Bryant, History and Issues 
of the Environmental Justice Movement, in Our Backyard: A Quest for Environmental 
Justice 3, 3 (Gerald R. Visgilio & Diana M. Whitelaw eds., 2003); Robert D. Bullard, Envi-
ronmental Justice for All, in Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communi-
ties of Color 3, 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental 
Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility 
Siting Decisions, 19 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 211, 213–22 (1994). See generally Luke W. Cole & 
Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the 
Environmental Justice Movement (2001). 
3 See Mank, supra note 2, at 103. 
4 Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629. (requiring “each Federal agency [to] make 
achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as ap-
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agencies took up the task of integrating the concern for environ-
mental justice into their decisionmaking procedures, though the Or-
der did not provide a private cause of action to enforce its mandates.5 
An obvious place to inject this new consideration was into agencies’ 
preexisting analytic frameworks for implementing the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).6 NEPA has long required fed-
eral agencies to assess the environmental impacts of proposed major 
federal actions and their alternatives as part of its goal of encouraging 
“productive and enjoyable harmony” between human activities and 
the environment.7 In 1997, the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) issued guidance to assist the integration of environmental jus-
tice into NEPA analyses.8 Other agencies, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), developed their own tailored guidance 
documents, building upon the CEQ foundation.9
 A review of the years following these developments raises the 
question: How effective is NEPA as a tool for addressing environ-
mental justice concerns? This Essay considers NEPA’s limitations and 
potential for this purpose, and assesses the role of case law and judi-
cial review in shaping this integrative process. Part I provides a brief 
overview of NEPA and the environmental justice guidance issued by 
                                                                                                                      
propriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of 
its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income popula-
tions”). 
5 See id.; Mank, supra note 2, at 107–23. The Order is clear in its language: 
This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the ex-
ecutive branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right, beneªt, or 
trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by 
a party against the United States, its agencies, its ofªcers, or any person. 
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7632–33. 
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2000). 
7 Id. §§ 4321, 4332. 
8 Council on Envtl. Quality, Environmental Justice: Guidance Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act 1 (1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/ 
regs/ej/justice.pdf. The CEQ is a cabinet-level council created by NEPA, housed in the 
Executive Ofªce of the President, and responsible for promulgating NEPA’s implementing 
regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342–4344. The regulations speciªcally state that the CEQ “may 
provide further guidance concerning NEPA and its procedures . . . which shall in plain 
language provide guidance and instructions concerning the application of NEPA and 
these regulations.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.7 (2005). 
9 EPA, Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in 
EPA’s NEPA Compliance Analyses § 1.0 (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/policies/ej/ej_guidance_nepa_epa0498.pdf [hereinafter EPA Guid-
ance]. 
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CEQ and EPA. Part II addresses the environmental justice implica-
tions of NEPA’s structural gaps, including exemptions, categorical ex-
clusions, and so-called functional equivalents. Part III evaluates judi-
cial review of agencies’ environmental justice analyses to date. 
I. NEPA and the Guidance 
 Under NEPA, federal agencies must prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) for “major Federal actions signiªcantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment.”10 The deªnition of “ma-
jor Federal actions” includes: federal activities, such as establishing 
government policies and regulations; undertaking or authorizing fed-
eral projects, issuing federal permits, activities “which are potentially 
subject to Federal control and responsibility,” for example, through 
the dispensation of federal funds; and an agency’s “failure to act” 
when such omission is reviewable by courts.11 NEPA regulations pro-
vide for a preliminary Environmental Assessment (EA) where the 
signiªcance of the environmental impact of a given action is un-
clear.12 By preparing an EA, an agency should be able to determine 
whether the potential for signiªcant environmental impact warrants a 
full-scale EIS or whether it can safely declare a Finding of No 
Signiªcant Impact (FONSI) and conduct no further environmental 
review.13 The signiªcance of an action’s impacts will depend upon 
intensity as well as context—there must be “‘a reasonably close causal 
relationship’ between the environmental effect and the alleged 
cause.”14 NEPA requires that these inquiries be conducted “at the ear-
liest possible time” in an agency’s planning process to ensure that the 
impacts and alternatives considered can truly inform decisionmak-
ing.15
 When an EIS is necessary, NEPA regulations direct agencies to 
consider “all reasonable alternatives” to the proposed action, includ-
                                                                                                                      
10 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000). 
11 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2005). However, funding received solely as general revenue 
sharing funds does not supply the requisite control necessary to trigger NEPA. Id. For an 
argument that courts should interpret major federal action more broadly or that NEPA 
should be revised to expand its reach, see Browne C. Lewis, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt 
You: The Importance of Information in the Battle Against Environmental Class and Racial Discrimi-
nation, 29 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 327, 361–68 (2005). 
12 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3. 
13 Id. § 1501.4. 
14 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting Metro. Edison 
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)); see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. 
15 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2. 
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ing the alternative of “no action,” and explore possible mitigation 
strategies.16 The scope of the analysis must extend to direct, indirect, 
and cumulative impacts on health, as well as ecological, aesthetic, his-
torical, cultural, economic, and social resources.17 However, economic 
and social effects can only trigger an EIS to the extent that they are 
interrelated with the physical environmental effects of an action.18 
When a draft EIS is completed, the agency must solicit and respond to 
comments from the public—speciªcally and afªrmatively from “those 
persons or organizations who may be interested or affected”—and 
other relevant federal, state, or local agencies.19 In addition, agencies 
must “make diligent efforts to involve the public” by way of 
notiªcation, public disclosure of comments and underlying docu-
ments, and public hearings or meetings.20 The ªnal EIS must include 
the agency’s responses to comments and is followed by a record of 
decision selecting one of the alternatives.21 Importantly, NEPA con-
tains no substantive requirement that agencies select the most envi-
ronmentally sensitive alternative among those considered.22 Thus, 
NEPA is “essentially procedural,” its goal is “to help public ofªcials 
make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental 
consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the 
environment,” without requiring them to do so.23 This is the funda-
mental limitation of NEPA as a tool for environmental justice and 
other forms of environmental protection.24 However, NEPA is widely 
regarded as an invaluable, if indirect, protective measure because it 
makes environmental considerations a central part of federal deci-
sionmaking and opens the process to public dialogue and scrutiny.25
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. § 1502.14. 
17 Id. §§ 1508.25, 1508.14, 1508.8. For the deªnition of direct and indirect effects, see 
id. § 1508.8. Impacts and effects are used synonymously. Id. Cumulative impacts refer to 
the “incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person 
undertakes such other actions.” Id. § 1508.7. 
18 Id. § 1508.14. 
19 Id. § 1503.1. 
20 Id. § 1506.6. EPA regulations require at least one public meeting on all draft EISs. 
Id. § 6.400(c). 
21 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9, 1505.2. 
22 See id. § 1505.2. 
23 Id. § 1500.1(c); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 10. 
24 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 10. 
25 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(c), 1506.6. 
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 The Council on Environmental Policy (CEQ) Guidance “inter-
prets NEPA as implemented through the CEQ regulations in light of 
Executive Order 12898.”26 Environmental justice is consistent with— 
and even implicit in—the stated goals of NEPA, most notably the goal 
of assuring “‘for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aes-
thetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.’”27 Environmental jus-
tice provides the practical and conceptual speciªcity needed to lend 
content to this otherwise abstract ideal.28 To this end, the CEQ Guid-
ance sets forth several core principles that should supplement agen-
cies’ existing NEPA analyses: (1) consideration of the demographic 
composition of the affected area; (2) review of health data addressing 
multiple or cumulative exposure to environmental hazards; (3) rec-
ognition of social, economic and other “factors that may amplify the 
. . . environmental effects of the proposed agency action”; (4) devel-
opment of strategies for overcoming “barriers to meaningful partici-
pation”; and (5) inclusion of “diverse constituencies” from affected 
communities into the NEPA process.29 Nevertheless, the CEQ Guide-
lines remind agencies that under NEPA, identifying a disproportion-
ate or adverse impact will “not preclude a proposed agency action 
from going forward, nor does it necessarily compel a conclusion that 
a proposed action is environmentally unsatisfactory.”30
 The EPA Guidance is signiªcantly more detailed, providing 
deªnitions for key terms—such as “minority population”—and a long 
list of demographic, economic, historical, and other factors for ana-
lysts to make part of their NEPA considerations.31 It identiªes “three 
vantage points” from which to approach an environmental justice 
analysis: “1) whether there exists a potential for disproportionate risk; 
2) whether communities have been sufªciently involved in the deci-
sionmaking process; and 3) whether communities currently suffer, or 
have historically suffered, from environmental and health risks or 
hazards.”32 This focus on disparate impact, along with the section de-
scribing “methods and tools for identifying and assessing dispropor-
tionately high and adverse effects,” sets the EPA Guidance apart from 
                                                                                                                      
26 Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 21. 
27 Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1994)). 
28 See id. at 8–10. 
29 Id. at 8–9. 
30 Id. at 10. 
31 See EPA Guidance, supra note 9, §§ 2.0–2.3. 
32 Id. § 2.3. 
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CEQ Guidance.33 The EPA Guidance speciªcally calls for environ-
mental justice concerns to be identiªed and addressed in both EA 
and EIS documents.34
 To the extent that the NEPA process leads to better federal deci-
sionmaking, raising and investigating environmental justice issues is a 
positive development.35 Against the backdrop of NEPA’s inherent limi-
tation in being procedural rather than substantive, a desirable beneªt 
is that analysts and decisionmakers will recognize and reject proposals 
that will result in disproportionate adverse impacts in low-income and 
minority areas.36 The political scrutiny that agencies can expect when-
ever a project touches on environmental justice will inevitably serve a 
similar protective function.37 Through increased efforts and improved 
strategies for public outreach, investigation of environmental justice 
issues will facilitate political scrutiny at the local level.38 NEPA does 
not remedy past injustices, but rather has the potential to help agen-
cies avoid existing patterns of inequality.39 By addressing environ-
mental justice concerns, federal agencies better serve NEPA’s “twin 
aims” of ensuring that agencies “‘consider every signiªcant aspect of 
the environmental impact of a proposed action’” and “inform the pub-
lic that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its deci-
sionmaking process.”40
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. § 5.0. 
34 Id. § 3.1. 
35 Cheryl A. Calloway & Karen L. Ferguson, The “Human Environment” Requirements of 
the National Environmental Policy Act: Implications for Environmental Justice, 1997 Detroit C.L. 
Mich. St. U. L. Rev. 1147, 1174 (“Consideration of environmental justice issues will help 
ensure that all Americans will have the opportunity to live in sustainable communities 
. . . .”). But see Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 
Mich. L. Rev. 1991, 1995 (1992) (expressing skepticism about the usefulness of the NEPA 
process overall, given that agencies frequently proceed with plans despite adverse im-
pacts). 
36 See Calloway & Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1173. 
37 See id. at 1174. 
38 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 13; EPA Guidance, supra note 9, 
§§ 4.0–4.2; Sheila Foster, Impact Assessment, in Law of Environmental Justice, supra note 
2, at 256, 285; see also Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA’S in the Quest for Environmental 
Justice, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 565, 567–68 (1997). 
39 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.1–.2 (2005). 
40 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (quot-
ing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 
(1978)). 
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II. Gaps in NEPA 
 Even if it is assumed that agencies will fully integrate environ-
mental justice into NEPA, its usefulness is limited by express and judi-
cially recognized exceptions to NEPA’s requirements, as well as struc-
tural gaps within the statutory and regulatory framework.41
A. Public Participation 
 At its best, public participation can improve government deci-
sionmaking by increasing government accountability, educating 
ofªcials about the local impacts of their decisions, bringing the full 
range of stakeholder viewpoints into dialogue, and shaping end re-
sults to better serve the public interest.42 Unfortunately, the timing 
and structure of public participation under NEPA raise doubts about 
whether environmental justice concerns will be brought to bear on 
agencies’ substantive decisionmaking.43 This is problematic because 
public participation is important to agencies’ understanding of envi-
ronmental justice issues, and because CEQ and EPA guidance rely 
heavily on it as a method for addressing inequity.44
1. Environmental Assessments 
 Determining whether NEPA requires an EIS for a proposed ac-
tion may be the most crucial step in the NEPA process.45 Through the 
EA, an agency decides whether or not the action will signiªcantly af-
fect the environment; the agency will go forward with an EIS or issue 
a FONSI.46 NEPA’s implementation underscores the importance of the 
EA.47 As Professor Stephen M. Johnson notes, “approximately ninety-
nine percent of the actions reviewed by agencies under NEPA each 
year are reviewed in the context of an EA, rather than an EIS.”48 Al-
though NEPA regulations call on agencies to involve the public in 
preparing EAs, public participation is only required by NEPA after the 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1328 (9th Cir. 1992); Webb v. Gor-
such, 699 F.2d 157, 159–60 (4th Cir. 1983). 
42 See generally Sheila Foster, Public Participation, in Law of Environmental Justice, 
supra note 2, at 185, 185–229. 
43 See id. at 197. 
44 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 13; EPA Guidance, supra note 9, 
§§ 4.0–4.2; Foster, supra note 42, at 185. 
45 See Foster, supra note 42, at 196–97. 
46 Id. at 196. 
47 Id. 
48 Johnson, supra note 38, at 575; see also Foster, supra note 38, at 292 n.35. 
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EA is completed, through the notice and comment provisions for an 
EIS.49 Thus, ªxed opportunities for public involvement become avail-
able only if an EA reveals a potentially signiªcant impact on the envi-
ronment and the agency proceeds to scope and draft an EIS.50 How-
ever, the EPA Guidance acknowledges that in practice, “there has 
been limited public involvement before and during EA preparation 
by EPA unless there is a question of signiªcance . . . or some particu-
lar public interest.”51 From an environmental justice perspective, this 
is troubling, because if the agency issues a FONSI without public in-
volvement in its EA process, no meaningful opportunity remains.52 
FONSIs are made public once complete, but no public decisionmak-
ing occurs thereafter.53 As was clear in Society Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n 
v. Rendell, this fact is not lost on the public.54 In Rendell, residents of a 
Philadelphia neighborhood, the proposed site of a city-sponsored ho-
tel and parking garage construction project, claimed that the public 
hearings in which they were allowed to review the FONSI “were little 
more than a charade.”55 It was clear to the residents that “the project 
was a ‘done deal’ before public hearing was held.”56
2. Notice and Comment 
 After an agency decides to prepare an EIS, CEQ regulations re-
quire that a notice of intent be published in the Federal Register be-
fore the agency begins “scoping” the issues it plans to address.57 Once 
it has completed a draft EIS, the agency must solicit comments from 
the public, “afªrmatively soliciting comments from those persons or 
                                                                                                                      
49 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a) (2005). 
50 Foster, supra note 42, at 196. 
51 EPA Guidance, supra note 9, § 4.1; see also Soc’y Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Ren-
dell, 210 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that “public hearings may or may not be 
required during an EA”). 
52 See Foster, supra note 42, at 196. 
53 See id. 
54 210 F.3d at 180. 
55 Id. at 179. 
56 Id. The residents cited statements by the Executive Director of the City Planning 
Committee and the Vice President of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corpora-
tion, each referring to the project as “a done deal.” Id. However, the court, after stating 
that “we understand why the Residents might feel that their opposition fell upon deaf ears 
even though they were ªnally able to voice it,” decided that the “decision to forego an EIS 
was [not] ‘arbitrary and capricious’ or ‘without observance of procedure required by law’ 
under the [Administrative Procedures Act].” Id. at 180. 
57 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2005). 
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organizations who may be interested or affected.”58 However, given 
the limited amount of public participation that takes place at the EA 
stage, these opportunities come late in the decisionmaking process.59 
Notice and comment offers an opportunity for the public to learn 
and express opinions about a proposed project, and for the agency to 
see which alternatives are politically sensitive; there is only a negligi-
ble chance that an agency will choose the no action alternative at this 
stage.60 Naturally, an agency will not be inclined to let the time, effort, 
and expense that went into a draft EIS go to waste because the in-
vestment and institutional momentum are powerful forces behind the 
project.61 As one commentator has observed, “the agency usually ends 
up defending its plan instead of taking citizens’ comments and actu-
ally formulating a plan based on the citizen concerns. . . . [T]here is 
no way for the agency and the public to develop any sort of meaning-
ful discourse.”62
 Therefore, the value of public involvement in NEPA is 
signiªcantly limited by the structure and timing of its public participa-
tion provisions.63 The minimal outreach at the crucial EA stage, com-
bined with a project’s momentum by the notice and comment stage, 
creates an impression that the public is appeased rather than an ac-
tual part of the decisionmaking process.64 This is particularly limiting 
in the environmental justice context, in which agency expertise and 
familiarity have historically lacked depth and mistrust of government 
is common.65 The CEQ Guidance documents recognize the inade-
quacy of typical government outreach methods and recommend a 
range of new approaches that, if used, will be a step in the right direc-
                                                                                                                      
58 Id. § 1503.1(a)(4). 
59 EPA Guidance, supra note 9, § 4.1; Foster, supra note42, at 196. 
60 See Sara Pirk, Expanding Public Participation in Environmental Justice: Methods, Legisla-
tion, Litigation and Beyond, 17 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 207, 213 (2002). 
61 See id. 
62 Id. at 213–14 (citations omitted). 
63 See Foster, supra note 42, at 196–97 (noting that public participation is only manda-
tory during the scoping of the EIS, after the EA has been prepared). 
64 See, e.g., Soc’y Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 183 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(discussing that the City of Philadelphia dismissed the residents’ concerns for nonlegiti-
mate reasons, such as costliness). 
65 See Foster, supra note 42, at 189. See generally Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public 
Citizens, and Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 
687 (1995); Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 459 (2002). 
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tion.66 Nevertheless, it is important to understand the limitations of 
the overall structure in which these approaches will be applied.67
B. State Programs Implementing Federal Environmental Statutes 
 NEPA’s reach is limited under environmental statutes that states 
may elect to administer with EPA approval, such as the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act 
(CWA),68 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),69 or the 
Clean Air Act (CAA).70 In effect, these statutes allow delegations of 
federal authority to the states; however, as Johnson notes, when a state 
agency issues a permit under such a program, “that action is probably 
not a federal action for NEPA purposes.”71 Likewise, even where EPA 
may be authorized to review state permitting decisions under such 
programs, the simple act of review does not indicate the degree of 
federal control or responsibility likely to trigger NEPA.72
 Sixteen states have adopted their own versions of NEPA— com-
monly referred to as SEPAs—and many have incorporated environ-
mental justice within those frameworks.73 There is no similar parallel 
for any of the remaining thirty-four states that administer federal envi-
ronmental requirements.74 This does not imply that states without 
SEPAs have done nothing to address environmental injustice in deci-
sionmaking, though their initiatives are inevitably fragmented.75 One 
key beneªt of NEPA or a state equivalent is that it applies to the full 
spectrum of government agencies—notwithstanding how their missions 
may vary—whenever their activities signiªcantly affect the environ-
                                                                                                                      
66 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 13; EPA Guidance, supra note 9, 
§§ 4.0–.2. 
67 See Foster, supra note 42, at 196. 
68 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2000). 
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
71 Johnson, supra note 38, at 595 n.126. 
72 Id. 
73 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 1, at 120; see also Johnson, supra note 38, at 566–67 
(commenting that a number of SEPAs are stronger than NEPA and that NEPA would 
beneªt from emulating the states’ innovations). 
74 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 1, at 120; see also Johnson, supra note 38, at 597–99 
nn.135–41. 
75 See generally ABA Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities et al., Envi-
ronmental Justice for All: A Fifty-State Survey of Legislation, Policies, and Ini-
tiatives (Steven Bonorris ed., 2004) (documenting state efforts to integrate environ-
mental justice into policymaking). 
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ment.76 Where neither NEPA nor an equivalent state environmental 
review applies, it is less likely that environmental justice will consistently 
be a part of ofªcial decisionmaking.77
C. Statutory Exemptions 
 The CWA and the CAA explicitly exempt EPA from NEPA com-
pliance when acting under the authority of those laws.78 Section 511 
of the CWA provides that “no action of the [EPA] Administrator taken 
pursuant to [the Act] shall be deemed a major Federal action 
signiªcantly affecting the quality of the human environment within 
the meaning of [NEPA].”79 Similarly, the Energy Supply and Envi-
ronmental Coordination Act of 1974 provides that “[n]o action taken 
under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed a major federal action 
signiªcantly affecting the quality of the human environment within 
the meaning of [NEPA].”80
 With respect to § 511 of the CWA, there has been some debate as 
to whether the section achieves a complete exemption from NEPA’s 
requirements or a partial exemption excusing only the preparation of 
an EIS, while retaining the consideration of alternatives.81 In the words 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Anchorage v. United States: 
[D]etermining the precise scope of section 511’s exemption 
places this panel squarely on the horns of a dilemma. A 
complete exemption from NEPA requirements would enable 
EPA to act more expeditiously in fulªlling its purpose of pro-
tecting the environment. . . . However, “it cannot be assumed 
that EPA will always be the good guy.” Indeed, some have 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 570. 
77 See id. at 568–69. 
78 EPA Guidance, supra note 9, § 1.2.1. Section 309 of the CAA requires EPA to “review 
and comment in writing on the environmental impact of any matter relating to duties and 
responsibilities” arising from a range of federal sources, such as legislation, proposed regu-
lations, and certain federal projects. Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2000). The 
Executive Order speciªcally directed EPA to use § 309 review to ensure that agencies ana-
lyze environmental justice issues; however, the EPA Environmental Justice Guidance ex-
pressly does not apply to that review. EPA Guidance, supra note 9, § 1.2.2. 
79 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 511, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (2000). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (2000) (internal citation omitted). 
81 See Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1328 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to de-
cide the question as a matter of law); Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157, 161 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(suggesting that EPA is excused from considering alternative actions when it is not re-
quired to prepare an EIS). 
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suggested that a complete exemption from NEPA require-
ments for EPA will result in no one policing the police.82
 Under either approach, the exemption may eliminate the envi-
ronmental justice review that NEPA might otherwise compel.83 Nei-
ther the CWA nor the CAA matches NEPA’s full spectrum of consid-
erations or emphasis on public participation.84 This need not imply 
that environmental justice will be ignored in both the CWA and the 
CAA contexts; but, by comparison, its integration into permitting and 
application review will be haphazard and less reliable.85
D. “Functional Equivalents”: Judicial Exemptions 
 Courts have long held that if a statute contains the “functional 
equivalent” of NEPA’s review process, a NEPA review would be redun-
dant and unnecessary.86 The ªrst case to recognize this concept was 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA.87 In that case, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA) contained review provisions functionally equiva-
lent to NEPA, thereby relieving EPA of dual responsibilities under both 
statutes.88 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no 
EA or EIS was required before EPA declared a three thousand acre aq-
                                                                                                                      
82 980 F.2d at 1328 (quoting Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 
(D.C. Cir. 1973)). Here, the court read § 511 broadly to exempt a memorandum of 
agreement between EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, ªnding that participation of an 
agency other than EPA did not affect the scope of the exemption. Id. Such memoranda 
could apply to a wide range of water-dependent projects with environmental impacts that 
raise environmental justice concerns. See id. (discussing the broadness of § 511’s exemp-
tion). Exemptions have been justiªed in much the same way as functional equivalents as a 
means of avoiding duplication of effort. See id. at 1329; infra Part II.D. As the Anchorage 
court noted, § 404 of the CWA required EPA “to consider many of the same things that 
NEPA would require . . . .” 980 F.2d at 1329. In that case, the court also supported its con-
clusion by noting that “the Corps must perform an EIS and comply with the other re-
quirements of NEPA when issuing a permit pursuant to the guidelines” even if EPA did 
not. Id. 
83 See Anchorage, 980 F.2d at 1328. 
84 See EPA Guidance, supra note 9, § 1.2.1. 
85 See id. 
86 See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
87 Id. at 1257; see also Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 778–79 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 
NEPA inapplicable where Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act provided 
more speciªc pesticide registration requirements). But see Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 729 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1989) (rejecting Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission’s assertion that a ªnding of “adequate protection of public 
health and safety” precluded the need for further consideration under NEPA). 
88 Envtl. Def. Fund, 489 F.2d at 1254–57. 
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uifer exempt from the Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA) standards be-
cause SWDA procedures and analysis “covered the core NEPA con-
cerns.”89
 Although EPA has considered environmental justice issues when 
acting under the authority of these statutes, the NEPA review approach 
outlined in the CEQ Guidance will not apply.90 In addition, while the 
analytical components of environmental impact assessment under 
other statutes may be similar, not all “functionally equivalent” statutes 
require consideration of key NEPA factors relevant to environmental 
justice.91 For example, environmental justice advocates doubt the pur-
ported functional equivalence between NEPA and RCRA, under which 
EPA issues operating permits to hazardous waste facilities.92 In Alabama 
ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, the state of Alabama and environmental organi-
zations challenged EPA for issuing a permit for “the nation’s largest 
commercial hazardous waste management facility” without complying 
with NEPA.93 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that although 
“RCRA does not require EPA to consider every point the agency would 
have to consider in preparing a formal EIS under NEPA,” RCRA was 
functionally equivalent and the “more speciªc counterpart of NEPA.”94 
The court explained that the rationale for “limiting the sweep of NEPA 
stems, in part, from the traditional view that speciªc statutes prevail 
over general statutes dealing with the same basic subjects.”95 However, 
as with the statutory exemptions for the CAA and the CWA, there are 
key differences between RCRA’s permitting procedures and NEPA.96 
For example, unlike NEPA, RCRA does not require consideration of 
socioeconomic impacts or indirect effects of its actions, “even when re-
lated to physical environmental impacts.”97 Furthermore, RCRA does 
                                                                                                                      
89 W. Neb. Res. Council v. EPA, 943 F.2d 867, 868–69, 872 (8th Cir. 1991) (afªrming 
EPA’s approval of the exemption which was “sought to permit injection-process mining of 
uranium ore deposits located in the aquifer”). 
90 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 16–17; Foster, supra note 38, at 
278–81 (discussing impact assessment under RCRA and SWDA). 
91 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 489 F.2d at 1256; Foster, supra note 38, at 278–79; Johnson, supra 
note 38, at 589–90. 
92 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 589–93. 
93 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990). 
94 Id. at 504–05. However, the fact that “some overlap” exists between the considera-
tions required under NEPA and another statute is not enough to support functional 
equivalency. Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 
719, 730 (3d Cir. 1989). 
95 Siegelman, 911 F.2d at 504. 
96 See Foster, supra note 38, at 278. 
97 See id.; Johnson, supra note 38, at 589–90 (criticizing Siegelman as “a poorly reasoned 
decision”). 
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not require consideration of alternatives and its public participation 
provisions are weaker than NEPA’s.98
 Since most states now administer RCRA, the more signiªcant limit 
to NEPA with regard to waste facility permitting is that these actions are 
not “major federal actions.”99 However, the comparison demonstrates 
the potential weakness of the functional equivalency doctrine when ap-
plied to statutes that may appear similar to NEPA, but have substantive 
differences with environmental justice implications.100 Professor John-
son advocates revising NEPA regulations to improve upon case law, 
claiming that to be functionally equivalent, the alternative decision-
making process must consider the same factors as NEPA, “including 
socioeconomic impacts, mitigation, and alternatives. The regulations 
should further provide . . . opportunities for public participation that 
are substantially similar to those required by NEPA.”101
E. Categorical Exclusions 
 The CEQ regulations authorize each federal agency to deªne 
categories of actions within its jurisdiction “which do not individually 
or cumulatively have a signiªcant effect on the human environment” 
to be wholly excluded from the requirements of NEPA.102 The 
efªciency value of this provision is obvious—generally, actions taken 
within a categorical exclusion will not warrant the time and expense 
of environmental analyses.103 Although these technical gaps in NEPA 
are unlikely to harm the environment or implicate environmental jus-
tice, the possibility should not be ruled out. For example, it may be 
appropriate for the Secretary of the Treasury to create a categorical 
exclusion for the clariªcation of tax rules, though expansion of a tax 
credit for use of gasoline-ethanol blends was challenged under NEPA 
in Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen.104 Florida Audubon Society ar-
gued that an EIS should have been prepared because an incentive to 
increase ethanol production would lead to increased agricultural use 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Foster, supra note 38, at 278–79. 
99 Johnson, supra note 38, at 595 n.126; see Foster, supra note 38, at 279. 
100 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 596. 
101 Id. 
102 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(p), 1508.4 (2005); see City of Grapevine v. Dep’t of Transp., 17 
F.3d 1502, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (construing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4). 
103 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(p), 1508.4. 
104 94 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see Calloway & Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1163. 
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of forest lands.105 In Friends of Pioneer Street Bridge Corp. v. Federal High-
way Administration, residents of Montpelier, Vermont unsuccessfully 
challenged the Federal Highway Administration’s categorical NEPA 
exclusion of a bridge replacement project.106 The proposed action 
involved removing a historic bridge from the site, moving it to a new 
location, and replacing it with a new bridge, which the residents 
claimed would increase trafªc, alter development patterns, and raise 
environmental justice concerns.107
 Although these cases are rare, if a categorical exclusion applies to 
a proposed federal action, it may be difªcult for environmental advo-
cates to convince a court to require environmental review of potential 
impacts. Courts afford “substantial deference” to agency decisions to 
categorically exclude projects from NEPA’s requirements.108
F. Statutory and Other Legal Conºicts 
 When there is “clear and unavoidable conºict” between NEPA 
and other statutory authority, it is NEPA that gives way because 
“‘NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other stat-
ute.’”109 Therefore, agencies are excused from compliance with NEPA 
under such circumstances.110 To the extent that the agency in ques-
tion has not adopted environmental justice guidelines or regulations, 
any environmental justice review that might have been performed 
under NEPA is eliminated.111
 Courts have been hesitant to recognize such conºicts, however. 
For example, in Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Atomic 
Energy Act could not be read to “preclude application of NEPA by im-
plication.”112 Rather, the court was clear that “compliance with NEPA is 
required unless speciªcally excluded by statute or existing law makes 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Bentsen, 94 F.3d at 662. The merits of this claim were never considered because 
the court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 665–69 (explaining the determination 
of “standing in an EIS matter”). 
106 150 F. Supp. 2d 637, 651 (D. Vt. 2001). 
107 Id. at 651–53. 
108 City of New York v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 4 F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1993). 
109 Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976) (quoting 
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973)). 
110 See id. at 791. 
111 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 593. 
112 869 F.2d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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compliance impossible.”113 Only where statutory provisions “‘necessar-
ily collide with NEPA’” will an agency implementing the competing 
statute be relieved of the NEPA duty to assess environmental impacts.114 
Similarly, in Davis v. Morton, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
clined to ªnd a statutory conºict between NEPA and 25 U.S.C. § 415— 
a statute regulating leases on Indian lands—holding that “unless the 
obligations of another statute are clearly mutually exclusive with the 
mandates of NEPA, the speciªc requirements of NEPA will remain in 
force.”115
 NEPA has given way to other statutes and will likely do so again in 
the future, with the probable result of limiting review of environmental 
justice concerns.116 For example, in Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic 
Rivers Ass’n, the U.S. Supreme Court found a conºict between NEPA 
and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, which required the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to allow statements of 
record to take effect within thirty days of being ªled.117 Because it 
would be impossible for an EIS to be completed in such a short period 
of time, the Disclosure Act superceded NEPA’s requirements.118
 In addition, other legal conºicts may relieve an agency of NEPA 
compliance if the conºict would render NEPA review meaningless.119 
In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, the Court held that 
NEPA did not compel the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administra-
tion (FMCSA) to consider the environmental effects of its rules for 
lifting a moratorium on certain cross-border Mexican trucking opera-
tions.120 The Court reasoned that because the President ordered the 
moratorium lifted pursuant to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), FMCSA had no authority “categorically to ex-
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. (ªnding that “[t]he directive to agencies to minimize all unnecessary adverse 
environmental impact obtains except when speciªcally excluded by statute or when exist-
ing law makes compliance with NEPA impossible” (citing Pub. Serv. Co. v. NRC, 582 F.2d 
77, 81 (1st Cir. 1978))). 
114 Id. at 730 (quoting Pub. Serv. Co., 582 F.2d at 81). 
115 469 F.2d 593, 598 (10th Cir. 1972); see also Catron County Bd. of Comm’rs v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Endangered 
Species Act’s critical habitat designation provision does not conºict with NEPA); cf. Pac. 
Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 841 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that NEPA conºicts 
with the Endangered Species Act provisions for listing species as threatened or endan-
gered). 
116 See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n., 426 U.S. 776, 791–92 (1976); Ala-
bama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504–05 (11th Cir. 1990). 
117 426 U.S. at 788–92. 
118 See id. at 790. 
119 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 766 (2004). 
120 Id. at 773. 
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clude Mexican motor carriers from operating within the United 
States.”121 Thus, even if FMCSA were to comply fully with NEPA, other 
statutory obligations would be violated if it were to refuse to authorize 
the increased cross-border activity based on environmental impacts 
discerned in an EIS: “FMCSA simply lacks the power to act on what-
ever information might be contained in the EIS.”122 According to the 
Court, “[i]t would not . . . satisfy NEPA’s ‘rule of reason’ to require an 
agency to prepare a full EIS due to the environmental impact of an 
action it could not refuse to perform.”123 In other words, FMCSA’s 
action was not “the legally relevant cause of the entry of the Mexican 
trucks”; rather, it was “the actions of the President in lifting the mora-
torium and those of Congress in granting the President this authority 
while simultaneously limiting FMCSA’s discretion.”124
 Whatever the effects of a federal action may be, “a ‘but for’ causal 
relationship is insufªcient to make an agency responsible for a par-
ticular effect under NEPA . . . .”125 This case is important from an en-
vironmental justice perspective, since no one questioned that air qual-
ity degradation would result from increased cross-border activity of 
highly polluting Mexican trucks, especially in impoverished border 
communities.126 Because of statutory and separation-of-powers 
conºicts, environmental review under NEPA gave way to economic 
and foreign policy considerations at the heart of the President’s 
NAFTA decision.127 The decision was made without analyzing alterna-
tives, mitigation possibilities, cumulative impacts on border communi-
ties, or health effects of degraded air quality, all of which would have 
been central to NEPA review.128
III. Judicial Review 
 This Part focuses on how well NEPA functions in the hands of 
environmental justice advocates. Unlike many of the major environ-
mental statutes, NEPA does not contain a citizen suit provision for 
                                                                                                                      
121 Id. at 766. 
122 Id. at 768. 
123 Id. at 769. 
124 Id. Actions of the President, such as international treaties like NAFTA, are not “ma-
jor federal action” subject to NEPA because they are not “reviewable by courts or adminis-
trative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law as agency 
action.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2005). 
125 Dept. of Transp., 541 U.S. at 767. 
126 See generally id. 
127 See id. at 766. 
128 See id. at 764–70. 
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private enforcement.129 Instead, NEPA challenges must be advanced 
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which provides a 
general private right of action to seek judicial review of ªnal agency 
actions.130 The APA authorizes a reviewing court to “compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” and to “hold un-
lawful and set aside agency action, ªndings, and conclusions found to 
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law . . . [or] without observance of procedure re-
quired by law . . . .”131 This standard is deferential to agency decisions, 
leaving the burden of convincing a court that a decision should be 
disturbed upon the plaintiff.132 The role of the court is not to inter-
ject itself into the agency’s “‘area of discretion . . . as to the choice of 
the action to be taken,’” but simply to “insure that the agency has 
taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences.”133 Thus, courts 
will uphold administrative action if the agency “has considered the 
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.”134
 NEPA challenges typically attack one or more of the following 
issues: the appropriateness of a FONSI, procedural compliance, or 
the adequacy of EIS analyses.135 To challenge a FONSI, a plaintiff 
must show that it was arbitrary and capricious for the agency to con-
clude that the proposed project would have no signiªcant impact on 
the environment.136 Environmental justice may be relevant to whether 
an agency’s estimation of “signiªcance” is accurate, though such chal-
lenges may only succeed if they raise environmental justice concerns 
that are closely related to the physical harm of a natural resource.137
 Process challenges enforce compliance with NEPA’s procedural 
requirements and ensure that an EA or EIS occurs early enough in 
the process to be instructive to decisionmakers, rather than a post-hoc 
                                                                                                                      
129 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2000). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. § 706. 
132 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 
390, 410 n.21 (1976). 
133 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.21 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 
F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
134 Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). 
135 See Foster, supra note 42, at 196. 
136 Dept. of Transp., 541 U.S. at 763. 
137 EPA Guidance, supra note 9, § 3.2. 
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rationalization or a meaningless bureaucratic exercise.138 In this cate-
gory, environmental justice concerns are most likely to bear on the 
adequacy of public participation in the NEPA process.139
 To challenge the adequacy of analysis under NEPA, cases have 
focused on the scope of assessment, the agency’s analytical methods 
of choice, the range of alternatives considered, or whether the agency 
properly considered cumulative or indirect impacts.140 Environmental 
justice should inform the notion of analytical “adequacy” in a number 
of ways.141 For example, the “affected environment” the agency must 
investigate will determine the geographic scope of impact analysis; 
how broadly or narrowly it is deªned determines whether dispropor-
tionate risks or burdens can be identiªed.142 Environmental justice 
may clarify which alternatives should be selected for indepth consid-
eration or weigh in favor of certain impact assessment tools.143 In ad-
dition, it should enrich cumulative impact evaluations by increasing 
awareness of how such impacts are experienced and by whom. 
 The foregoing categories of NEPA challenges were available be-
fore Executive Order 12,898 and the CEQ and EPA Guidance docu-
ments explicitly recognized environmental injustice as a problem.144 
Indeed, many environmental justice actions were brought under 
                                                                                                                      
138 CEQ regulations require agencies to “integrate the NEPA process with other plan-
ning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reºect environ-
mental values . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (2005). 
An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment as close as possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented 
with a proposal . . . [and] shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve 
practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and 
will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made. 
• 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5. 
139 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2, 1502.5. 
140 See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 291, 296 (E.D.N.C. 1981). 
141 See Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 161 F.3d at 575; Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 
291, 296. 
142 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 14; see also EPA Guidance, supra 
note 9, § 1.2. 
143 See Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 161 F.3d at 575 (noting that, “[a]n agency . . . is 
‘entitled to identify some parameters and criteria . . . for generating alternatives to which it 
would devote serious consideration.’” (quoting Res. Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1307 
(9th Cir. 1993))). 
144 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 14; EPA Guidance, supra note 9, 
§ 1.2. 
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NEPA without framing their claims in those terms.145 Although the 
Order, EPA Guidance, and CEQ Guidance were signiªcant statements 
of policy, none created a private right of action to compel environ-
mental justice review under NEPA.146 The Order explicitly states that 
it “shall not be construed to create any right to judicial review involv-
ing the compliance or noncompliance of the United States, its agen-
cies, its ofªcers, or any other person with this order.”147 Likewise, the 
CEQ Guidance “interprets NEPA as implemented through the CEQ 
regulations in light of Executive Order 12898,” but “does not create 
any rights, beneªts, or trust obligations, either substantive or proce-
dural, enforceable by any person, or entity in any court . . . .”148 The 
EPA Guidance is also clear: “Compliance with this guidance will not 
be justiciable in any proceeding for judicial review of agency ac-
tion.”149 In light of these disclaimers, a key question is what, if any-
thing, these new mandates add to judicial review in NEPA challenges. 
 After the Executive Order went into effect—and despite the pro-
vision precluding judicial review—numerous parties sought unsuc-
cessfully to enforce its mandate in court.150 In Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians v. FAA, the tribe challenged a FONSI for a new airport landing 
route directly over their reservation for failing to sufªciently consider 
alternative pathways.151 The tribe charged FAA with violating NEPA, 
as well as the Department of Transportation’s Environmental Justice 
                                                                                                                      
145 For example, in Warren County, the county challenged a PCB landªll siting decision 
by seeking judicial review of the adequacy of the State’s EIS for the project. 528 F. Supp. at 
280. Though unsuccessful, many regard this case as the one that launched the environ-
mental justice movement. See Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and 
Environmental Quality 35–38 (1990). For a more recent case, see Tex. Comm. on Natural 
Res. v. Van Winkle, 197 F. Supp. 2d 586 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (discussing challenge of an Army 
Corps of Engineers’ EIS for the Dallas Floodway Extension project by environmental 
groups). 
146 See generally Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Popula-
tions and Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629–33 
(Feb. 11, 1994), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 ( Jan. 30, 1995); 
Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8; EPA Guidance, supra note 9. 
147 Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7633. 
148 Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 8, at 21. 
149 EPA Guidance, supra note 9. 
150 See, e.g., Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 
2004); Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Senville v. Peters, 327 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D. Vt. 2004); Coliseum Square Ass’n, v. HUD, No. 
Civ.A. 02-2207, 2003 WL 1873094 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2003); Friends of Pioneer St. Bridge 
Corp. v. Federal Highway Administration, 150 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D. Vt. 2001). 
151 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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Order and Executive Order 12,898.152 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reviewed the NEPA claim because NEPA’s regulations require 
agencies to “‘[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reason-
able alternatives.’”153 However, it disregarded the Department of 
Transportation and Executive Orders out of hand, noting that each 
speciªcally stated that “they do not create any right to judicial review 
for alleged noncompliance.”154 This has been the common judicial 
response to such attempts, although some courts have claimed juris-
diction under the APA if an agency has included environmental jus-
tice in a NEPA document.155
 In Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals paraphrased the language of the Executive 
Order to explain that “an ‘environmental justice’ analysis [is] in-
tended to evaluate whether the project would have disproportionately 
high and adverse human health or environmental effects on low-
income or minority populations.”156 It reasoned that “FAA exercised 
its discretion to include the environmental justice analysis in its NEPA 
evaluation, and that analysis therefore is properly subject to ‘arbitrary 
and capricious’ review under the APA.”157 The federal district court in 
Vermont followed suit in Senville v. Peters, noting that a private cause of 
action was not necessary because the court had “jurisdiction over 
[Plaintiffs’] claim pursuant to its ability under the APA to review envi-
ronmental documents for compliance with NEPA.”158 Because 
“[d]efendants chose to include an environmental justice analysis in 
their evaluation . . . [the] analysis is therefore subject to review . . . 
under the APA.”159 Other courts have merely reviewed environmental 
justice analyses included by agencies in their EISs without addressing 
the source of review authority.160 In Mid States Coalition for Progress v. 
Surface Transportation Board, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals un-
derstood that “[t]he purpose of an environmental justice analysis [in 
                                                                                                                      
152 Id. 
153 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (1994)). 
154 Id. 
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the NEPA context] is to determine whether a project will have a dis-
proportionately adverse effect on minority and low income popula-
tions. To accomplish this, an agency must compare the demographics 
of an affected population with demographics of a more general char-
acter . . . .”161 The court in Friends of Pioneer Street Bridge Corp. v. Federal 
Highway Administration did not hesitate to evaluate the Federal High-
way Administration’s (FHWA) consideration of environmental justice, 
but was careful not to say that it was required.162 The courts that have 
reviewed NEPA challenges based upon environmental justice have 
readily deferred to agencies’ assessments as adequate.163
 Though these courts have uniformly focused on agencies’ discre-
tion to consider environmental justice under NEPA, judicial review 
should be available whether or not an agency voluntarily included such 
analysis.164 One need not look beyond existing NEPA regulations to see 
that environmental justice inquiries are amply supported in the regula-
tions’ focus on “the natural and physical environment and the relation-
ship of people with that environment,” including economic and social 
impacts stemming from environmental harm.165 What the federal gov-
ernment now knows about environmental injustice and how to assess 
such impacts project-by-project gives content to this regulatory lan-
guage. Although the CEQ Guidance is a weak substitute for expressly 
adding environmental justice considerations to NEPA regulations—in 
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which case all courts would review agency compliance according to the 
same standards—courts should recognize that environmental justice is 
an inherent aspect of “the relationship of people with th[e] environ-
ment.”166
 Whether a proposal will “signiªcantly” affect the environment 
has long involved consideration of context and cumulative impacts.167 
The concept should not have to be outlined in the regulations in or-
der to inform judicial review of the adequacy of FONSIs, public out-
reach, scoping, or analysis and alternatives in an EIS, especially now 
that there is institutional awareness of the importance of these is-
sues.168 Both the EPA Guidance and CEQ Guidance documents add 
substantial depth to the federal government’s understanding of envi-
ronmental justice and demonstrate signiªcant comprehension of what 
is necessary to fully integrate these concerns into the NEPA proc-
ess.169 Thus, despite CEQ’s assertion that the Executive Order did 
“not change the prevailing legal thresholds and statutory interpreta-
tions under NEPA and existing case law,” judicial evaluation of an 
agency’s environmental justice analysis ensures that judicial review 
keeps pace with agency understandings of socioeconomic impacts.170 
At least with respect to alternatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has sug-
gested the concept of adequacy to be “an evolving one, requiring the 
agency to explore more or fewer alternatives as they become better 
known and understood.”171
 Under the APA standard—“arbitrary, capricious, [or] abuse of 
discretion”—a strong case may be made that to neglect to investigate 
a project’s impacts from an environmental justice perspective would 
be an abuse of discretion and a capricious choice.172 Agencies may 
not be required by law to consider environmental justice under 
NEPA, but they are obliged to fully consider and analyze direct, indi-
rect, and cumulative effects on the “human environment.”173 Without 
question, that obligation is enforceable by a reviewing court. Wher-
ever it cannot be adequately performed absent an environmental jus-
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tice analysis, that analysis should be required as a component of this 
most basic NEPA mandate. 
Conclusion 
 The promise of NEPA as a tool for environmental justice depends 
on how seriously federal agencies use it for that end. Judicial review 
under NEPA has shaped agencies’ approach to compliance not by 
forcing particular results on a case, but by keeping agencies honest 
and clarifying their NEPA obligations. If courts begin to include envi-
ronmental justice in their NEPA review with less apprehension, the 
depth of agencies’ treatment of the issue will likely improve incre-
mentally, just as it has in other areas reºected in the vast body of 
NEPA case law. 
 This Essay highlights the limits of NEPA’s reach and how integrat-
ing environmental justice into NEPA does not ensure that it will be 
addressed consistently for all federal activities. At the same time, there 
is hope that environmental justice will continue to grow as a federal 
and state concern so that it ªnds its way into all government deci-
sionmaking, regardless of whether NEPA applies to structure the 
process. As one commentator has observed, “environmental justice 
principles . . . increasingly are becoming part of the environmental 
decisionmaking fabric” and “hold the promise of making environ-
mental law more ethical.”174 Environmental justice teaches the true 
racial and socioeconomic character of NEPA’s “human environment.” 
Through judicial review, courts can assist agencies to better serve 
NEPA’s core goals and help ensure that those facing environmental 
injustice will have a voice in NEPA decisionmaking. 
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